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Abstract – Border control is the primary method to prevent rabies emergence. This study developed
a quantitative risk model incorporating stochastic processes to evaluate whether border control measures
could efﬁciently prevent rabies introduction through importation of cats and dogs using Taiwan as an
example. Both legal importation and illegal smuggling were investigated. The impacts of reduced quarantine
and/or waiting period on the risk of rabies introduction were also evaluated. The results showed that Taiwan’s
current animal importation policy could effectively prevent rabies introduction through legal importation
of cats and dogs. The median risk of a rabid animal to penetrate current border control measures and enter
Taiwan was 5.33 · 10
 8 (95th percentile: 3.20 · 10
 7). However, illegal smuggling may pose Taiwan to the
greatriskofrabiesemergence.Reductionofquarantineand/orwaitingperiodwouldaffecttheriskdifferently,
depending on the applied assumptions, such as increased vaccination coverage, enforced custom checking,
and/or change in number of legal importations. Although the changes in the estimated risk under the assumed
alternatives were not substantial except for completely abolishing quarantine, the consequences of
rabies introduction may yet be considered to be signiﬁcant in a rabies-free area. Therefore, a comprehensive
beneﬁt-cost analysis needs to be conducted before recommending these alternative measures.
rabies / importation / risk assessment / quarantine / animal
1. INTRODUCTION
Border control is the primary prevention
measure to keep a rabies-free region away from
rabies emergence. Canine rabies has been erad-
icated in Taiwan since 1961 because of the
efforts on animal quarantine, large-scale vacci-
nation, and stray animal control [24]. However,
until now, canine rabies is still considered to be
one of the most important threats to Taiwan.
For example, Taiwan is surrounded by rabies-
endemic countries, with which frequent com-
mercial and travelling activities occur. Taiwan
also has a high free-roaming-cat/dog population
density
1. The vaccination coverage rate in these
animals [24] is hard to reach the recommended
* Corresponding author: changcc@dragon.nchu.edu.tw
1 Fei C.Y., Estimating the size of household dog
and stray dog population in Taiwan, Council of
Agriculture, Taipei, 2001.
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Article published by EDP Sciencesthreshold (e.g. 70%) to prevent rabies outbreak
if once a rabid animal is introduced to Taiwan
[8]. Nevertheless, Taiwan has been able to
maintain rabies-free status until now, since the
last rabies outbreak during 1948–1961
2. This
success is mainly attributable to Taiwan’s iso-
lated geographic barrier, and also to its strict
border control on animal importation, which
includes a 21-day isolated quarantine period
and a minimum of 180-day waiting period in
the country of origin.
To prevent rabies introduction through ani-
mal importation, the current border control
measures implemented by the Taiwanese gov-
ernment require owners of imported companion
animals (cats and dogs) from rabies-infected
countries to (1) microchip and vaccinate (using
inactivated vaccine) the animals against rabies
(at the age of   90 days old), (2) wait in the
country of origin for an additional 180-day
to 1 year after the serological test, and (3) pro-
vide associated importation documents, includ-
ing a rabies vaccination certiﬁcate and the
results of the neutralization antibody titration
test for rabies antibody performed at one of
the authorized laboratories. After passing the
checking at the entry port, the animal is isolated
and quarantined for 21 days or longer and is
tested for rabies antibody again during the
quarantine.
In several rabies-free countries, similar
importation policies for companion animals
have been challenged mainly because of an
increasing awareness of animal welfare con-
cerns related to lengthy isolated quarantine
[9, 10, 13, 19]. Furthermore, with the develop-
ment of anti-rabies vaccination for animals
[12], the possibility and safety of replacing
quarantine with vaccination certiﬁcation in
controlling the emergence of rabies through
animal importation are among great debates
implicating professionals and government pol-
icy makers [4, 7, 11, 14, 26]. Therefore, the
objectives of this study were the following:
(1) quantify the risk of rabies introduction
through animal importation under the current
border control measures, (2) identify important
determinants of risk of rabies introduction, and
(3) compare the risk of rabies introduction
through legal importation under current border
control policy and under alternative policies.
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1. Animal importation and rabies
introduction
This study evaluated the risk of rabies introduc-
tion into Taiwan through legal and illegal (i.e. smug-
gling) importations of cats and dogs. All possible
pathways for a rabid cat/dog to enter Taiwan are dis-
played in Figure 1. The risk for a rabid animal enter-
i n gT a i w a nw a sm o d e l e db yt w os t a g e s .T h eﬁ r s t
stage was to quantify the risk of rabies infection in
the countries of origin. This risk was further stratiﬁed
by whether the animal was infected before or after
anti-rabies vaccination. The second stage was to
model the risk of a rabies-infected animal to success-
fully penetrate current or alternative border control by
animal importation regulations, port checking, and
law enforcement against smuggling. The variables
and their assigned probabilities displayed in Figure 1
were according to the implemented rabies prevention
measures. For example, the current border control
policy requires the owners of imported cats or dogs
to provide the results of neutralization antibody titra-
tion test for rabies antibody and associated importa-
tion documents, which will be examined by
Customs ofﬁcers at the entry port. After passing the
port checking, the animals will then undergo a 21-
day isolated quarantine. Details on the probability
and distribution assignments are discussed later.
2.2. Risk models
The risk of rabies introduction was quantiﬁed
using stochastic models with the variables ﬁtted with
different distributions. The information used to esti-
mate the model variables included the data from
the Bureau of Animal and Plant Health Inspection
and Quarantine (BAPHIQ) in Taiwan, literature
reviews, world rabies survey by the World Health
Organization (WHO), and compilation of expert
opinions. The model variables and their information
sources and assigned distributions are listed in
Table I. The following are detailed descriptions of
the model variables.
2 Department of Health, Executive Yuan, Taiwan
health statistics, Executive Yuan, Taiwan, Taipei,
1963.
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(page number not for citation purpose) Page 3 of 112.2.1. Rabies prevalence in cats and dogs in the
exporting country (PR)
Because the information on rabies incidence and
cat/dog population was only available for Canada,
the Philippines, Thailand, and the USA, the data from
these countries were used to estimate PR. Based on
the 2003–2007 importation records provided by the
BAPHIQ, approximately 76% of cats and dogs were
legally imported from these four countries, thus it is
reasonable to assume that this estimate is representa-
tive of the rabies prevalence in all exporting coun-
tries. Rabies prevalence for each of the four
countries was calculated by the number of rabies inci-
dence cases modeled using a gamma distribution
divided by the cat and dog populations modeled by
a normal distribution (Tab. I). The parameter values
of the gamma distribution were estimated using the
data collected from the WHO world rabies survey
3
and rabies surveillance in the USA [2, 3, 16–18].
The rabies incubation time of 75 days was used for
computation
4. The cat and dog populations in the
USA were estimated from the USA pet ownership
and demographic surveys [5, 20, 21]a n dU S A
Table I. Model variables, distributions, and information sources.
Model variable Distribution Information source
a
PR Canada Gamma(1.7, 1)/Normal(6.6 · 10
6, 1.68 · 10
5)[ 2, 3, 16–18]
PR Philippine Gamma(331.4, 1)/Normal(1.5 · 10
6, 8.0 · 10
4) Note
3
PR Thailand Gamma(82.5, 1)/Normal(6.1 · 10
6, 4.0 · 10
4) Note
3
PR USA Gamma(40.9, 1)/Normal(1.34 · 10
8, 9.2 · 10
6)[ 2, 3, 16–18]
IM Canada Lognormal(131.6, 17.13) BAPHIQ
b
IM Philippine Exponential(85.2) BAPHIQ
b
IM Thailand Exponential(287.2) BAPHIQ
b
IM USA Lognormal(371.42, 112.69) BAPHIQ
b
PRs Beta(1, 149)
c [25]
VC Triangle(0.56, 0.89, 1) [14]
VP (Beta(23, 4) + Beta(27, 5))/2 [1]
PB Uniform(0, 1) –
PR1 (VC · PB)/Total
d –
PR2 (VC · (1 VP) · (1 PB))/Total
d –
PR3 (1 VC)/Total
d –
PT 1 (Log-logistic(0,3.2221, 1.2429)/SEC)/N
e BAPHIQ
b
SEC Pert(0.1, 0.5, 0.9)
c Expert’s opinion
SPT Beta(31, 5) [6]
PC Log-logistic(0, 5.2118, 3.3618)/N
e BAPHIQ
b
I Log-logistic(14, 39.3, 2.02) Note
4
PE Pert(0.01, 0.5, 0.95)
c Expert’s opinion
N Uniform(100, 3075)
c BAPHIQ
b
Ns Exponential(39)/PE
c BAPHIQ
b
a Corresponding publications are listed in the references.
b Data provided by the Bureau of Animal and Plant Health Inspection and Quarantine.
c Different values were examined for sensitivity analysis.
d Sum of the numerators of PR1,P R2, and PR3.
e Truncated to contain the value between 0 and 1.
3 World Health Organization, WHO Rabies
Surveillance and Control – the World Survey of
Rabies [online] (2008) http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/
DataQuery/default.asp [consulted 15 August
2008].
4 World Health Organization, WHO expert
consultation on rabies, ﬁrst report, World Health
Organization, Geneva, Switzerland, 2004.
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5. Canada’s cat and dog population
data were collected from the 2002–2006 rabies sur-
veillance in the USA [2, 3, 16–18]. The dog popula-
tion data for Thailand and the Philippines were from
the WHO world rabies survey
3 and the paper by
Knobel et al. [15], in which the human-to-dog ratio
was estimated to be 9.5 in the Philippines. The PR
was the average of these four countries weighted
by the proportion of companion animals imported
from each of the four countries. The distribution of
the number imported (IM) for each of the four coun-
ties was estimated using the 2003–2007 importation
records collected by the BAPHIQ.
2.2.2. Rabies prevalence among smuggled cats/
dogs (PRs)
Despite the difﬁculty of collecting information on
the source of smuggled animals, it is reasonable to
assume that the majority of them are from neighbor-
ing countries, such as mainland China. In a study,
the brain tissue specimens collected from 5 of 283
healthy looking dogs from rural areas in the Guangxi
province in China were tested positive for rabies virus
[25], indicating that animals smuggled into Taiwan
c o u l db ec o m i n gf r o ma na r e aw i t hv e r yh i g hr a b i e s
prevalence. Taiwan currently does not allow animals
to be imported from China. Based on the evidence
available, a beta distribution assuming that rabies
prevalence among smuggled animals could be as high
as 0.02 (with a 95% certainty) and with a mode at the
expected value of PR (2.61 · 10
 5)w a sﬁ t t e dt oP Rs.
Different values of this variable were further simu-
lated to examine their inﬂuence on risk estimation.
2.2.3. Proportions of a rabid animal contracting
the disease before anti-rabies vaccination,
after vaccination, and without vaccination
(PR1,P R2, and PR3, respectively)
PR1,P R2,a n dP R3 were determined by vaccination
coverage (VC), vaccine protection rate (VP), and
probability of a vaccinated animal to contact the virus
before (PB) or after vaccination (1-PB). The estimate
of VC among imported animals was adopted from the
paper by Jones et al.[14]. The anti-rabies vaccine was
assumed to have protection only on animals that have
not been infected with the disease before vaccination.
VPwasassignedtoabetadistributionwiththeparam-
eters estimated on the basis of the USA Code of
Federal Regulations [1], which states that licensed
killed rabies vaccines against rabies intended for use
i nc a r n i v o r e sm u s tp r o t e c t2 2o f2 5o r2 6o f3 0a n i -
mals from an intramuscular challenge with a rabies
virus for 90 days post challenge and 80% of controls
must die from the challenge. The probability of a
vaccinated animal to contact the virus before or after
vaccination was assigned to a uniform distribution
ranging from 0 to 1.
2.2.4. Probability of providing valid
documentation of serological test for rabies
antibodies (PT)
The model assumed that the owner who did not
have the animal vaccinated would attempt to import
the animalwith forgery documentation, that is, PT =0
for the animal. For the animal that was vaccinated, PT
was estimated using the 2003–2007 records of the
BAPHIQ on forgery documentation and was ﬁtted
to a log-logistic distribution. PT was further adjusted
for the probability of successfully identifying forgery
documentation through port checking (SEC), which
was assumed to follow a pert distribution. Different
valuesforSECwere simulated to examine their effects
on estimating the risk of rabies introduction.
2.2.5. Probability for a serological test to
successfully identify an animal with
insufﬁcient antibody level against rabies
(SPT)
The cutoff used to deﬁne insufﬁcient antibody
level against rabies was a neutralizing antibody titer
of < 0.5 IU/mL given that the animal was not pro-
tected by the vaccine from rabies infection. This
probability was assigned to a beta distribution with
the parameter values estimated using the results from
the study by Cliquet et al. [6].
2.2.6. Probability of failing port checking other
than the reason of providing forgery
documentation (PC)
This variable was estimated by using the 2003 to
2007 animal importation port checking records pro-
v i d e db yt h eB A P H I Q .
2.2.7. Incubation periods for canine and wildlife
rabies (I)
The WHO expert consultation on rabies
4 states
that the incubation period for rabies ranges from 2
5 USA Census Bureau, Census 2000 Proﬁle
[online] (2002) http://www.census.gov/prod/2002
pubs/c2kprof00-us.pdf [consulted 28 April 2009].
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information was used to estimate the parameter
values for a log-logistic distribution ﬁtted to this
variable.
2.2.8. Time points at which the animal contracted
rabies
VT: Vaccination time, which was based on the
associated regulations and was assigned to a uniform
distribution.
T1: For cats and dogs imported via PR1. Assuming
that the animal contracted rabies one day before VT
in order to maximize the risk.
T2: For cats and dogs imported via PR2. Assuming
that the animal contacted the virus anytime between
VT and right before entry. Assigned to a uniform dis-
tribution ranging from 180 days to 360 days.
T3: For cats and dogs imported via PR3. Assuming
that the animal contracted rabies anytime within 6
months before entry.
The time to contracting the disease was crucial in
risk computation because it was assumed that a rabid
animal only can enter Taiwan if it has yet to show
clinical sign before entry. Thus, the probability that
an infected animal displayed a clinical sign after entry
was dependent on the time between infection and
entry, the incubation period, and the waiting period
in the exporting country and quarantine and/or mon-
itoring period in the importing country. Under the
probability distributions for and these time-related
variables, the probability that a rabid animal showed
clinical sign after entry was estimated using 100
Latin Hypercube simulations with 1 000 iterations
each. The mean and standard error derived from
the simulations were used in the computation of the
associated outcome measures.
2.2.9. Probabilities of a smuggled rabid cat/dog
being enforced by the authority (PE)
A pert distribution was assigned and different val-
ues of the variable were simulated to examine their
effects on estimating the risk of rabies introduction.
2.2.10. Annual number of cats and dogs legally
imported to Taiwan (N)
We used 2003 to 2007 importation records
provided by the BAPHIQ to estimate this variable.
A uniform distribution was ﬁtted to the variable.
Different variable values were simulated to examine
their effects on estimating the risk of rabies
introduction.
2.2.11. Annual number of cats and dogs
smuggled into Taiwan (Ns)
Data on smuggling (i.e. including only those hav-
i n gb e e ne n f o r c e db yp a t r o l s )w e r ep r o v i d e db yt h e
BAPHIQ. An exponential distribution was ﬁtted to
the variable based on the observed data. The ﬁnal
number of smuggling was adjusted for PE. Different
values for this variable were simulated to examine
their inﬂuence on risk estimate.
The major assumption of this risk model was that
the only possible routes for introducing rabies into
Taiwan through animal importation were when a
legally imported animal was infected but has yet to
display clinical sign before passing all border control
measures or when a rabid animal was illegally smug-
gled into Taiwan without being enforced by patrols.
Additional model assumptions were described as
follows:
(1) The risk of introducing rabies from rabies free
countries was 0, given the animal did not stop
inanyrabies-endemiccountryduringthetrans-
portation.
(2) The rabies prevalence in legally imported ani-
mals was assumed to be the same as the rabies
prevalence in their countries of origin.
(3) Probabilities of identifying forgery documenta-
tion for vaccination and serological test were
the same and independent.
(4) All smuggled animals were assumed to be at
riskofbeinginfectedwithrabies,thatis,novac-
cination protection among smuggled animals.
(5) Entry of Taiwan was deﬁned as being released
from quarantine (including monitoring for wild
animals). Thus,it was assumed that a rabid ani-
malwouldpostnoriskifitwasidentiﬁedduring
quarantine or monitoring.
Sensitivity analysis was used to explore important
determinants of risk of rabies introduction and to
evaluate the inﬂuence of the variables that were not
supported by sufﬁcient information, including PRs,
SEC,P E,a n dN s ,o nr i s ke s t i m a t e .
2.3. Outcome measures
Three outcome measures were used to quantify
the risk of introducing rabies into Taiwan through
animal importation: (1) the probability for a rabid ani-
mal to penetrate rabies prevention measures and enter
Vet. Res. (2010) 41:11 H.-Y. Weng et al.
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at least one rabid animal through animal importation
(P), and (3) the expected number of years for entry of
the ﬁrst rabies case (Y). The relationship among
these three outcome measures were displayed in the
following equations (1) and (2):
P ¼ 1  ð 1   /Þ
k ð1Þ
Y ¼
1
/k
ð2Þ
where k is number of animals imported to Taiwan
annually.
Equation (1) assumed that imported animals were
independent from each other and that each of them
had the same probability of being infected and enter-
ing Taiwan. Equation (2) assumed that the assigned
probabilities of the model variables were constant
across years.
2.4. Interventions
Three speciﬁc alternative cat/dog importation pol-
icies, involving the reduction of the length of quaran-
tine and/or waiting periods, were evaluated in this
study. The ﬁrst intervention was to reduce the length
of quarantine period from 21 days to 14, and 7 days,
and to abolish isolated quarantine completely (thus
also discontinue the second rabies antibody serologi-
cal test). The second speciﬁc intervention was to
reduce the minimal waiting time in the country of ori-
gin from 180 days to 90, 60, and 21 days. The third
intervention was to cross-combine the ﬁrst two inter-
ventions; this is to reduce both quarantine and waiting
periods. Four risk models with different assumptions
were evaluated. In Model (1), the same assumptions
as in the model for the current policy were applied
except for changes in quarantine and/or waiting per-
iod. Model (2) assumed that the spare resource from
the reduction of quarantine period could be used to
enhance the port checking (SEC) by 0–10% (assigned
a triangle distribution with a mode at 5%) and thus
would result in increasing VC by 0–10% (using the
same Triangle distribution). Model (3) assumed that
the alternatives would increase the number of legal
importation of cats/dogs by 0–30% (mode at 15%),
0–50% (mode at 25%), and 0–100% (mode at 50%)
for a 14-day (90-day), 7-day (60-day), and 0-day
(21-day) quarantine (waiting) period, respectively
(all were assigned to triangle distributions). When
combing a reduced quarantine period with a reduced
waiting period, the changes were assumed to be
addictive. For example, annual number of legally
imported cats/dogs was assumed to increase by
0–60% (assigned a triangle distribution with a mode
at 30%) for a 14-day quarantine combining with a
90-day waiting period. Model (4) used the assump-
tions made in both Model (2) and Model (3). The
annual probability of introducing at least one rabid
animal through legal importation of cat/dog (P)e s t i -
mated by each of the four risk models was compared
with the P estimated under the current policy.
2.5. Simulations
The models and equations were constructed into
Microsoft Excel, and @Risk 5.0 [22] was used to
perform the Latin Hypercube simulations. The mod-
els were run for 10 000 iterations with a ﬁxed initial
seed of 12 345. The median and the 5th and 95th per-
centiles from the simulation are reported.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Legal importation under current border
control policy
Overall, the risk of a rabid animal to pene-
trate current border control measures and enter
Taiwan (i.e. /) was very low with a median of
5.33 · 10
 8 and the 95th percentile of
3.20 · 10
 7 (Tab. II). A non-vaccinated rabid
animal contributed most to the risk of rabies
introduction (both / and P). A vaccinated ani-
mal that contracted the disease after vaccination
contributed slightly more to / than a vaccinated
animal that contracted the disease before vacci-
nation. On the contrary, a vaccinated animal that
contracted the disease before vaccination con-
tributedslightlymore toPthanavaccinatedani-
malthat contracted thediseaseaftervaccination.
The median number of years for the ﬁrst rabies
case to enter Taiwan through legal importation
of cats and dogs under the current policy was
1 822 years with the 5th percentile of 473 years.
3.2. Illegal smuggling
Smuggling placed Taiwan at a great risk of
rabies introduction with the median annual
probability of 0.098 and the 5th and 95th per-
centiles of 0.003 and 0.737, respectively. The
median number of years for the ﬁrst rabies case
to enter Taiwan through illegal importation of
Risk assessment of rabies Vet. Res. (2010) 41:11
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centile of 9.6 months.
3.3. Determinates of rabies introduction
The results indicate that the proportion of
animals imported from the Philippines had the
strongest (positive) correlation with the risk of
a rabid cat/dog to enter Taiwan (/), followed
by the speciﬁcity of the serological test (SPT),
and then the probability of identifying forgery
documentation (SEC). Both SPT and SEC had
a negative correlation with /. The results also
suggest that the risk of rabies introduction
was high through animal smuggling unless it
was almost fully controlled.
Table III. Difference (·10
 5) in the medain annual probability of introducing at least one rabid cat or dog
through legal importation under different reduced quarantine and/or waiting periods, after comparing to the
probability under the current policy (i.e. a 21-day quarantine and 180-day waiting periods).
Quarantine period Model
a Waiting period
21 60 90 180
0 Model (1) 112.61 92.37 83.61 71.19
Model (2) 99.23 76.41 67.77 55.63
Model (3) 223.49 162.52 140.28 111.29
Model (4) 199.41 138.19 115.24 86.40
7 Model (1) 6.47 4.35 3.27 1.96
Model (2) 5.22 2.52 1.60 0.36
Model (3) 15.96 9.68 7.50 4.31
Model (4) 13.48 7.28 5.11 1.97
14 Model (1) 5.03 3.03 2.23 1.18
Model (2) 3.46 1.77 0.53  0.36
Model (3) 12.41 6.73 4.89 2.39
Model (4) 10.15 5.06 2.82 0.59
21 Model (1) 3.53 1.98 1.11 0
Model (3) 8.32 3.88 2.27 0
a Model (1) assumed no other changes except for the quarantine/waiting period; Model (2) assumed an increase in
the probability of successfully identifying forgery documentation through port checking and in vaccination
coverage; Model (3) assumed an increase in the number of legal importation; and Model (4) included both
assumptions of Model (2) and Model (3).
Table II. Probability for a rabid cat or dog to penetrate border control measures and enter Taiwan (/) and
annual probability of introducing at least one rabid animal into Taiwan (P) through legal importation by
time to infection.
/ P
Median 5th, 95th percentiles Median 5th, 95th percentiles
Infected before
vaccination
3.68 · 10
 9 2.89 · 10
 10, 2.59 · 10
 8 2.64 · 10
 6 5.26 · 10
 8, 3.03 · 10
 5
Infected after
vaccination
4.97 · 10
 9 1.81 · 10
 10, 5.93 · 10
 8 5.43 · 10
 7 1.62 · 10
 9, 2.57 · 10
 5
Infected without
vaccination
3.89 · 10
 8 3.79 · 10
 9, 2.63 · 10
 7 1.33 · 10
 5 4.20 · 10
 7, 1.93 · 10
 4
Total 5.33 · 10
 8 6.79 · 10
 9, 3.20 · 10
 7 6.96 · 10
 5 5.72 · 10
 6, 5.71 · 10
 4
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Table III summarizes the results from the
comparison of median annual probability of
introducing at least one rabid cat/dog through
legal importation (i.e. P) under each investi-
gated alternative policy and Taiwan’s current
importation policy using different model
assumptions. Model (2), assuming SEC and
VC would increase by 0 to 10% if shortening
of the quarantine period, generated the smallest
change in P, while Model (3), assuming that N
would increase if shortening the quarantine and/
or waiting period, generated the largest change
in P among the four models. After comparing
the risk (6.96 · 10
 5) under the current policy
(180-day waiting period and 21-day quarantine
period), the results showed that the complete
abolishment of quarantine (and thus also the
second serological test for rabies antibody titer)
would increase the median P by 5.56 · 10
 4 to
2.23 · 10
 3. All the other investigated alterna-
tives changed the median P by  3.6 · 10
 6 to
1.60 · 10
 4.
4. DISCUSSION
This study quantitatively evaluated whether
different border control measures can effec-
tively prevent the introduction of rabies into a
rabies-free area through importation of cats
and dogs using Taiwan as an example. The
selection of Taiwan as the study site provided
several advantages to address the research ques-
tions of interest. Taiwan, unlike the regions
implicated in previous studies that were con-
ducted in rabies-free areas [7, 14, 19, 23], is
located nearby the region with high rabies prev-
alence, and the risk assessment performed in
this study included animal importation from
the high risk areas, such as Thailand and the
Philippines. Taiwan, however, has similar
importation regulations as other rabies-free
countries, such as Japan, which make the results
from this study generally applicable to these
areas.
The study results show that the risk of rabies
introduction through legal importation of cats
and dogs under Taiwan’s current border control
policy was pretty low. The true risk is believed
to be even lower because we used conservative
estimates for the key variables, such as high
rabies prevalence in the country of origin (PR)
and long rabies incubation period (I), in the
models. Further breakdown of the different
importation routes revealed that the greatest risk
of rabies introduction among legally imported
animals was through those who are not vacci-
nated against rabies. This ﬁnding highlights
the importance of port checking on forgery doc-
umentation, and the additional serological test
for rabies antibody titers performed during the
quarantine period. The results of sensitivity
analysis and investigation of alternative policies
further supported this argument. The speciﬁcity
of the serological test (SPT) and probability of
identifying forgery documentation (SEC)w e r e
among the most inﬂuential determinants of risk
estimate and complete abolishment of quaran-
tine (thus also the serological test during quar-
antine) resulted in a sharp increase in the risk
of rabies introduction. In addition, rabies preva-
lence in the exporting country was identiﬁed as
one of the most important determinants of
rabies introduction into Taiwan through animal
importation. Because rabies prevalence varies
greatly across countries, a uniform border
control policy may not be efﬁcient enough to
prevent rabies introduction. Targeting importa-
tions from high risk areas by increasing the
level of border control measures, for example,
more rigorous port checking and/or only allow-
ing animals from these areas with boost vacci-
nation to enter, may be favored. Although
complete restriction of importation from high
risk areas is another possibility, it may result
in an increase in the number of illegal smug-
gling from these areas and adversely increase
the risk of rabies introduction.
Our study demonstrates the importance of
controlling illegal smuggling in rabies preven-
tion. With the presumed high rabies prevalence
among smuggled animals, our risk model esti-
mated that the risk of rabies introduction could
be reduced to an acceptable level only when
almost all the smuggled animals were identiﬁed
and enforced. This ﬁnding urges the Taiwanese
government and the public to be prepared for
the strike of the disease, if smuggling activity
Risk assessment of rabies Vet. Res. (2010) 41:11
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public health education on the risk of rabies
introduction through smuggling animals should
be considered and applied continuously.
Although not investigated in this study, the
ﬁnding also stresses the importance of the
rabies control measures after rabies has
emerged, such as increasing public awareness
of the disease, vaccination campaign, and stray
animal population control, to further protect
Taiwan from this fatal disease.
Recently, several studies [7, 11, 14]h a v e
been conducted to evaluate the impact of short-
ening the quarantine time and waiting period on
rabies introduction, not only because of the con-
cern for animal welfare but also to encourage
people to import animals through legal routes.
However, it is important to carefully consider
other factors if shortening of these periods is
to be directly applied. For example, longer peri-
ods will still offer beneﬁts of preventing the
imported country from the introduction of other
unknown or new emerging infections. The ﬁnd-
ing that the animals infected after vaccination
are more likely to penetrate the control mea-
sures than the animals infected before vaccina-
tion further reﬂects the importance of
quarantine and waiting periods on identifying
rabid animals that have yet displayed clinical
signs. Moreover, after shortening these periods,
if the number of smuggling still remains the
same but the number of legal importation
increases, the overall risk of rabies introduction
may be increased to an unacceptable level, as
previously discussed by Jones et al. [14]. In this
study, we not only evaluated the impact of dif-
ferent intervention alternatives on the risk of
rabies introduction but also investigated their
impacts under different assumptions. As shown
in Table III, the increase in risk varied depend-
ing on which model assumption was applied.
Although our results suggest that most of the
increases in the risk of rabies introduction due
to the investigated alternatives were not sub-
stantial except for the complete abolishment
of quarantine, the consequences of rabies intro-
duction may yet be considered to be signiﬁcant
in a rabies-free area.
In conclusion, our study demonstrates that
current importation policies for cats and dogs
in Taiwan work well on preventing rabies emer-
gence. Port checking, especially targeting
importations from high risk areas, is important.
Illegal smuggling could be the main concern for
rabies introduction. Whether the reduction of
quarantine or the waiting period is favorable
depends on the applied model assumptions
and a comprehensive beneﬁt-cost analysis is
essential before recommending these alternative
measures.
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